

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9949

S E C R E T MOSCOW 2275

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: EXAMINATION AND CUSTODY OF
VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT ROUND VI - TTBT/PNE DELEGATION
MESSAGE NO 53

1. FOLLOWING ARE DELEGATION COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ON
STATE 37571 AND NEW SOVIET TEXT MOSCOW 2272.

2. AT PLENARY FEBRUARY 16, MOROKHOV SAID SOVIET SIDE
WOULD ACCEPT US ARTICLE VII PARA 3 (CONCERNING ARRANGEMENTS
FOR FAMILIARIZATION WITH EQUIPMENT) IF AGREEMENT REACHED
ON FOLLOWING PARA 4. PROVISIONS OF CURRENT PARA 3
DIFFER FROM DESCRIPTION IN STATE 37571 PARA 2 IN TWO
RESPECTS:

(A) 90 VERSUS 150 DAYS; AND

(B) REQUIREMENT TO RETURN EQUIPMENT 30 DAYS AFTER
EXPLOSION VERSUS REQUIREMENT TO RETURN EQUIPMENT BEFORE
EXPLOSION.

3. COMMENT: DIFFERENCES NOTED IN PARA 2, ABOVE, PROBABLY
NOT PROBLEM WITH SOVIETS, BUT DIFFERENCE PARA 2(B) WILL
BE RAISED IMMEDIATELY WITH SOVIETS IN CONTEXT OF THEIR
PROPOSAL. IS SPECIFICATION FOR EQUIPMENT RETURN IN
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STATE 37571 PARA 2 A FIRM REQUIREMENT?

4. STATE 37571 PARA 2 SPECIFIES THAT "THESE TWO SETS COULD BE DEMONSTRATED TO BE IN GOOD WORKING ORDER." SOVIET PROPOSED TEXT DOES NOT INCLUDE SUCH A PROVISION. SHOULD WE VOLUNTEER THE PROVISION SPECIFIED IN STATE 37571 PARA 2? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE ON WHAT IS INTENDED BY THIS PHRASE.

5. STATE 37571 PARA 2 SPECIFIED THAT CHOICE OF EQUIPMENT

(BY HOST SIDE) TO BE MADE NOT LATER THAN 15 DAYS BEFORE BEGINNING OF EMPLACEMENT. SOVIET TEXT 10 DAYS PLUS 10 DAYS IMPLIES CHOICE TO BE MADE NOT LATER THAN 20 DAYS BEFORE BEGINNING OF EMPLACEMENT. IS 20 DAYS PLUS CLOSE ENOUGH TO 15 DAYS PLUS?

6. STATE 37571 PARA 2 SPECIFIED THAT EQUIPMENT WOULD BE "SEALED" IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES DURING ANY PERIODS WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EQUIPMENT TO BE UNATTENDED. WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT WORD "CUSTODY" IN THEIR SENTENCE ABOUT SECOND 10-DAY PERIOD, SOVIETS SAID THIS MEANT TO PROVIDE FOR SECURE STORAGE BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WHEN EQUIPMENT NOT BEING WORKED ON OR USED. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE WE SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR? (WE WILL SUGGEST LANGUAGE ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET TEXT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT HOST PARTY WILL NEVER HAVE "CUSTODY".)

7. WHAT IS MEANT BY "DETAILED EXAMINATION" IN STATE 37571 PARA 2? WHAT, SPECIFICALLY OR GENERALLY OR BY EXAMPLE, WOULD BE PRECLUDED?

8. STATE 37571 PARA 2 AS RECEIVED INCLUDES FOLLOWING:

BEGIN TEXT.

DETAILED EXAMINATION OF EQUIPMENT BY SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED IN JOINT CUSTODY, ... AND THE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SEALED IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES DURING ANY PERIODS WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE EQUIPMENT TO BE UNATTENDED.

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END TEXT.

QUESTION: DO THE DOTS INDICATE ANYTHING DROPPED IN TRANSMISSION?

9. LAST SENTENCE OF STATE 37571 PARA 2 COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM LAST SENTENCE SOVIET TEXT AND LAST SENTENCE

US ARTICLE VII PARA 4 NOW ON TABLE. IS THIS INTENDED?
IN LIGHT OF POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIETS MAY VIEW THIS
CHANGE IN CURRENT US POSITION AS FUNDAMENTAL BACKING-OFF
FROM PROVISION THEY REGARD AS VITAL, WE WONDER IF SUCH
CHANGE IS ESSENTIAL ONE. IF JUDGMENT IS YES, PLEASE
PROVIDE US WITH RATIONALE FOR PUTTING IT
FORWARD.

10. SOVIET TEXT PROPOSES 10 -DAY PERIOD FOR EXAMINATION
VERSUS 5 DAYS IN US ARTICLE VII PARA 4, AND 10-DAY
PERIOD SUBSEQUENTLY FOR WORK IN PREPARATION FOR USE
BEFORE BEGINNING OF EMPLACEMENT VERSUS 15 DAYS IN
US ARTICLE VII PARA 4. SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IS THAT
STATE 37571 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR PERIOD OF EXAMINATION
OF EQUIPMENT BY HOST PARTY BEFORE EXPLOSION. IN LIGHT
OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF US POSITION OF PRESENCE OF
DESIGNATED PERSONNEL DURING EQUIPMENT INSPECTION, WITH-
DRAWAL OF US POSITION WOULD BE REGARDED AS RETROGRESSIVE
STEP.

11. PLEASE ADVISE ON ABOVE BY OPENING BUSINESS FEBRUARY 17
MOSCOW TIME.
STOESSEL

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NNN

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